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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. 
White,1 the Supreme Court defined the scope of employer conduct that 
violates the retaliation provision embedded in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.2 The Court’s definition is broad enough to 
encompass the retaliatory harassment claim recognized by numerous 
courts.3 Retaliatory harassment subjects an employer to liability when its 
employee encounters a hostile work environment (“HWE”) in retaliation 
for engaging in protected activity. While, prior to Burlington Northern, 
some courts have refused to recognize retaliatory harassment, no court 
has fully explored the practical consequences of this claim on American 
employers. This comment reviews the scope of employer liability for 
retaliatory harassment and the impediments an employer may face in 
attempting to avoid such liability.    
Congress passed Title VII to combat discriminatory employment 
practices.4 Title VII consists of two provisions: the main discrimination 
provision that proscribes “discrimination” against an employee because 
of her “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” and the retaliation 
provision that proscribes “discrimination” against an employee because 
she accused her employer of violating a Title VII provision.5 The 
Supreme Court construed the term “discrimination” under the main 
discrimination provision to prohibit tangible practices, such as hiring, 
firing or failing to promote, and intangible practices, whereby an 
employee’s co-workers or supervisors expose her to a HWE because of 
her protected characteristic.6 However, prior to Burlington Northern, the 
                                                                                                             
 1 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414-15 (2006). 
 2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
 3 Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (adopting the definition of retaliatory 
conduct relied upon by the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits, which both 
recognize retaliatory harassment). 
 4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), -3(a) (2006). 
 5 § 2000e-2(a), -3(a). 
 6 Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). 
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Supreme Court had provided little guidance on the meaning of 
“discrimination” under the retaliation provision, causing circuits to adopt 
one of three definitions.7 
The narrow-view circuits decided that “discrimination” in the 
retaliation context refers only to ultimate employment decisions that 
produce “tangible change[s] in duties or working conditions” and result 
in “material employment disadvantage[s].” 8 By contrast, the broad-view 
circuits held that “discrimination” includes any adverse actions 
reasonably likely to discourage employees from participating in 
protected activities.9 In the middle of these two standards were the 
moderate circuits that defined “discrimination” as ultimate employment 
decisions and other decisions that materially affect employment 
privileges, conditions, terms or compensation.10 In Burlington Northern, 
the Supreme Court adopted the broad-view circuits’ definition.11 Based 
on these definitions, the broad-view and moderate-view circuits 
recognized retaliatory harassment as actionable discrimination.12 
The broad-view circuits justified their position on the grounds that 
retaliatory harassment is reasonably likely to discourage an employee 
from participating in protected expression.13 The moderate-view circuits 
reasoned that retaliatory harassment could materially affect employment 
privileges, conditions, terms or compensation.14 These courts combined 
the law developed under the retaliation provision with the HWE law 
developed under the main discrimination provision to adjudicate 
retaliatory harassment claims. The narrow-view courts rejected the 
retaliatory harassment claim on the grounds that it can never constitute 
an ultimate employment decision.15 Because Burlington Northern has 
embraced the broad-view circuits’ approach, all courts must now 
                                                                                                             
 7 Cathy Currie, Case Note, Staying on the Straighter and Narrower: A Criticism of 
the Court’s Definition of Adverse Employment Action Under the Retaliation Provision of 
Title VII in Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000), 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 1323, 
1333 (2002). 
 8 See, e.g., Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 9 See, e.g., Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that 
“discrimination” includes refusals to promote, undesirable transfers and assignments, bad 
references and “toleration of harassment by other employees”). 
 10 See, e.g., Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Ross v. Commc’n Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 357 (4th Cir. 1985)) (holding that 
limiting employee’s job responsibilities, refusing to give her “a performance review and 
annual salary and benefit increases” and giving references based on false information can 
constitute adverse employment actions). 
 11 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006). 
 12 See infra Part V.B-C. 
 13 See id. 
 14 See id. 
 15 See infra Part V.A. 
272 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 3:269 
recognize retaliatory harassment. However, Burlington Northern does 
not require courts to rely on HWE harassment law in adjudicating 
retaliatory harassment claims. 
This comment addresses the confusion that results when courts use 
HWE harassment law from the main discrimination provision to 
adjudicate retaliatory harassment claims and the practical effects of this 
approach on employers’ ability to assess and prevent liability. Part II of 
this comment describes Title VII’s main provisions. Part III discusses the 
Supreme Court’s interpretations of “discrimination” under the main 
discrimination provision, the development of HWE law and the circuit 
courts’ divergent interpretations of the HWE standard. Part IV explains 
the circuit courts’ conflicting definitions of “discrimination” under the 
retaliation provision and the Supreme Court’s attempt to resolve the 
conflict in Burlington Northern. Part V discusses the broad-view and 
moderate-view circuits’ use of HWE law to create a new breed of 
retaliatory harassment claims. Part VI argues that this approach to 
adjudicating retaliatory harassment claims makes it extremely difficult 
for employers to avoid liability and allows plaintiffs with weak HWE 
claims to bypass HWE requirements and still recover damages. Finally, 
this comment suggests that, rather than continue to import HWE 
harassment law into the retaliation provision, lower courts should 
develop a new standard for adjudicating retaliatory harassment claims. 
II. TITLE VII GENERALLY 
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
primarily to effect a national commitment to ending racial discrimination 
in employment.16 However, Congress extended Title VII to proscribe 
employment discrimination based on race, color, religion and national 
origin.17 The Act’s ban on sex discrimination was attached as “an 
eleventh-hour amendment in an effort to kill the bill.”18 
                                                                                                             
 16 See WILLIAM M. MCCULLOCH ET AL., ADDITIONAL VIEWS ON H.R. 7152, H.R. REP. 
NO. 88-914, as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2513-16. In this excerpt, several 
members of Congress explain the great inequality in employment that African Americans 
experienced in the 1960s. Id. at 2513. African American communities incurred much 
larger unemployment percentages than white communities, and African American 
citizens were “largely concentrated among the semiskilled and unskilled occupations.”  
Id. Congress recognized that employers’ disparate treatment of African Americans 
stigmatized them and undermined their “incentive to strive for excellence in employment 
and education.”  Id. at 2514; see S. REP. NO. 88-872, as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2355, 2362-63. The background note describes that in 1960, the major political parties 
committed themselves to “a program of equal opportunity and elimination of racial 
discrimination.”  Id. at 2362. 
 17 S. REP. NO. 88-872, as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2356. 
 18 Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 767 n.1 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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“Although Title VII seeks ‘to make persons whole for injuries 
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination,’ its 
‘primary objective,’ like that of any statute meant to influence primary 
conduct, is not to provide redress but to avoid harm.”19 To that end, Title 
VII encourages employers to take reasonable measures to prevent 
employment discrimination, including advising employees of their rights 
under Title VII and establishing complaint procedures for discrimination 
victims.20 Title VII also provides for the creation of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), a federal agency 
charged with enforcing the Act.21 
Title VII’s main discrimination provision, section 703(a), makes it 
unlawful for an employer: 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.22 
Additionally, Title VII’s retaliation provision, section 704(a), prohibits 
an employer from 
discriminat[ing] against any of his employees . . . because [the 
employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by this title . . . or because he has made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title.23 
Section 703(a) and section 704(a) both proscribe “discrimination,” 
but it is not clear from the Statute’s text which employer acts constitute 
“discrimination.”24 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
                                                                                                             
 19 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998). 
 20 See id. 
 21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2006); see United States Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, http://www.eeoc.gov. 
 22 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
 23 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
 24 Donna Smith Cude & Brian Steger, Does Justice Need Glasses? Unlawful 
Retaliation Under Title VII Following Mattern: Will Courts Know It When They See It?, 
14 LAB. LAW. 373, 396-97 (1998). Cude and Steger write: 
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“discrimination” under section 703(a) is vague in numerous respects.25 
Consequently, lower courts disagree on key issues concerning section 
703(a) discrimination.26 Courts also disagree on various issues 
concerning section 704(a) discrimination, such as what kind of activity is 
protected from retaliation and what is the required connection between 
the protected activity and the employer’s discriminatory action.27 The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern did not resolve these 
issues; the Court only described employer reactions to protected activity 
that could constitute retaliation.28 When lower courts combine their 
interpretations of discrimination under section 703(a) with their 
interpretations of section 704(a) to adjudicate retaliatory harassment 
claims, they pile circuit splits on top of circuit splits. This approach 
leaves employers confused about the measures they must take to prevent 
liability. 
III. WHAT IT MEANS TO DISCRIMINATE UNDER THE MAIN 
DISCRIMINATION PROVISION 
The main discrimination provision proscribes employment policies 
that have a “disparate impact” on protected individuals or groups, and 
“disparate treatment” of protected individuals or groups.29 A disparate-
impact claim typically entails a facially neutral policy that produces an 
adverse effect on a protected class.30 The policy may expose an employer 
to liability if he cannot justify it as being necessary for business.31 To 
prevail on a disparate impact claim, the plaintiff does not need to prove a 
causal link between the employer’s policy and her protected 
characteristic.32 
                                                                                                             
 It is undisputed that the word “discriminate” means “to make a 
difference in treatment or favor.”  In the legal context, the word ‘against’ is 
defined as “adverse to.”  Thus, it logically follows that by prohibiting 
“discrimination against” employees, Section 704(a) forbids employers from 
adversely treating employees for engaging in protected activity. The degree 
of harm necessary to trigger Section 704(a)’s protection is, however, unclear 
from the statute. 
Id. 
 25 Kingsley Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and 
the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 502 (1991). 
 26 See infra Part III.B. 
 27 See infra Part IV.A.1-2. 
 28 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006). 
 29 1 MARK ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 182-256 (3d ed. 2004). 
 30 MACK A. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: IN A 
NUTSHELL 111-13 (5th ed. 2004). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
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A disparate treatment claim can be based on a tangible 
discriminatory practice that “constitutes a significant change in 
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, 
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision 
causing a significant change in benefits.”33 Alternatively, it can be based 
on an intangible discriminatory practice that creates “‘a working 
environment heavily charged with . . . discrimination.’”34 Both 
discrimination forms require proof of a causal link between the 
employer’s action and the plaintiff’s protected characteristic.35 
In tangible discrimination cases, the plaintiff can prove causation 
by showing her employer acted with discriminatory intent.36 The plaintiff 
can proffer direct37 or circumstantial38 discriminatory intent evidence. If 
the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, she must establish that: (1) 
she belongs to a class protected under Title VII; (2) she qualified for the 
job, promotion or benefit at issue; and (3) the job, promotion or benefit 
“either remained open or was instead given to a person who is a member 
of a different class.”39 Subsequently, the burden shifts to the employer to 
establish a nondiscriminatory justification for its action.40 If the employer 
meets its burden, the plaintiff will have to prove that the employer’s 
justification is really a pretext for discrimination.41 
                                                                                                             
 33 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998); see ROBERT N. 
COVINGTON & KURT H. DECKER, EMPLOYMENT LAW: IN A NUTSHELL 220 (2d ed. 2002) 
(discussing the two forms of tangible employment actions). 
 34 COVINGTON & DECKER, supra note 33, at 220 (quoting  Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. 
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986)). 
 35 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 246. 
 36 David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex?  The Causation Problem in 
Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1710 (2002). 
 37 MICHAEL ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 90, 92-93 (6th ed. 2003) (explaining that this proposition was 
established in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)); see also  ROTHSTEIN 
ET AL., supra note 29, at 191-93. Rothstein writes that direct evidence consists of 
statements demonstrating the decision-maker’s bias toward a protected characteristic. Id. 
Rothstein cites the following remarks that courts accepted as direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent: “calling an employee a ‘damn woman’ for gender discrimination; 
telling an employee that she ‘needed a good Christian boyfriend to teach her to be 
submissive’ for religious discrimination; . . . and calling an employee a ‘black radical’ 
who would stir up racial discontent as evidence of racial discrimination.”  Id. at 192-93. 
 38 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (prescribing a 
framework for proving discriminatory intent through circumstantial evidence); see also 
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs Bd. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (expanding on the 
McDonnell Douglas framework). 
 39 COVINGTON & DECKER, supra note 33, at 212-13. Covington and Decker note that 
circumstantial evidence of discrimination is much more common than direct evidence 
because an employer seldom “publicize[s] its bias.”  Id. at 212. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
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A. Hostile Work Environment Discrimination 
The plaintiff alleging disparate treatment based on intangible 
employment practices must prove causation by showing that her 
employer exposed her to HWE harassment because of her protected 
characteristic. In the past two decades, the Supreme Court has provided 
several guidelines for pleading a prima facie HWE harassment claim. 
However, the HWE precedent still contains many gaps and ambiguities 
that have resulted in numerous circuit splits on the HWE standard. 
The Supreme Court for the first time recognized and defined HWE 
harassment in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson..42 In Vinson, the plaintiff 
brought a sexual harassment suit against her employer, the bank, alleging 
that her manager groped her, exposed himself to her and had a 
continuous sexual relationship with her.43 However, the employer did not 
expressly promise the plaintiff employment security or other benefits in 
exchange for sexual favors.44 The Supreme Court held that even though 
the plaintiff’s claim did not involve tangible discrimination or economic 
loss, it is still cognizable under section 703(a) as HWE harassment.45 The 
Court explained that section 703(a) covers two general types of sexual 
harassment: quid pro quo and HWE.46 Quid pro quo harassment is a form 
of tangible discrimination, whereby a supervisor demands a sexual favor 
from his employee in exchange for an employment benefit.47 HWE 
harassment, on the other hand, does not involve a conditional demand for 
sexual favors, but rather exists where the plaintiff’s work environment is 
filled with sexually charged conduct.48 The Court then defined HWE 
harassment as “‘conduct [having] the purpose or effect of unreasonably 
interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.’”49 The Court 
also held that HWE harassment is actionable only if it is unwelcome and 
                                                                                                             
 42 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). It is important to note 
that while Vinson and its progeny address sexual harassment claims, the HWE framework 
these cases establish also applies to racial, ethnic and religious discrimination.  Jennie 
Randall, Comment, Don’t You Say That!: Injunctions Against Speech Found to Violate 
Title VII are Not Prior Restraints, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 990, 998-1003 (2001). 
 43 Vinson, 477 U.S. at 59-61. 
 44 See id. 
 45 Id. at 64. The Court stated that section 703(a)’s prohibition on discrimination with 
regard to “‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’” refers to a wide range of 
disparate treatment of women and men, not just to “‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ 
discrimination.”  Id. 
 46 Id. at 65. 
 47 See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)). 
 48 See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)). 
 49 Id. 
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so severe and pervasive that it changes the plaintiff’s terms and 
conditions of employment.50 
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,51 the Supreme Court developed 
two standards for determining whether workplace discrimination is 
sufficiently “‘severe or pervasive.’”52 First, the Court held that the 
plaintiff must prove that a reasonable person would have perceived her 
environment as hostile and abusive, and that she subjectively perceived 
her environment as such.53 Second, the Court added that “whether an 
environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by looking 
at all of the circumstances.”54 Some relevant circumstances, according to 
the Court, are whether the conduct threatened or humiliated the 
employee or unreasonably interfered with her job performance.55 
Further, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,56 the 
Supreme Court explained that the Harris test requires a “careful 
consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs 
and is experienced by its target.”57 The Court provided the following 
example: “A professional football player’s working environment is not 
severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on 
the buttocks as he heads onto the field-even if the same behavior would 
reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach’s secretary (male or 
female) back at the office.”58 The Supreme Court also imposed a 
limitation on HWE claims: they are not a means of regulating workplace 
etiquette. In Oncale, the Court stated that Title VII is not intended as a 
“general civility code.”59 The Court explained that by requiring 
discrimination to be “because of” a protected characteristic, Title VII 
precludes regulation of conduct that is not premised on a protected 
characteristic.60 
Last, the Supreme Court grappled with the issue of employer 
liability for HWE harassment in two landmark cases: Burlington 
Industries v. Ellerth61 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.62 Both cases 
hold an employer vicariously liable for a supervisor’s harassment 
                                                                                                             
 50 Id. at 67-69. 
 51 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 52 Id. at 21 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). 
 53 Id. at 21-22. 
 54 Id. at 23. 
 55 Id. 
 56 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 57 Id. at 81. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id.  
 60 Id. 
 61 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 62 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
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culminating in a tangible employment action.63 The Ellerth Court 
determined employer liability based on the “aided in the agency relation 
standard.”64 The Court explained that according to this standard, an 
employer is liable for his supervisor’s discrimination when the existence 
of the employment relationship, i.e., the nature of the supervisor’s 
authority within the company, enables the supervisor’s actions.65 The 
Court reasoned that an employer is always liable for its supervisor’s 
tangible employment actions, because by making someone a supervisor, 
the employer gives that individual authority to hire, fire, promote, 
demote or make other significant alterations in a subordinate’s 
employment status.66 
With respect to HWE cases, the Court held that it might be unfair to 
impute vicarious liability to the employer for a supervisor’s harassment 
because the agency relation does not necessarily aid the supervisor’s 
conduct.67 The Court reasoned that by making one a supervisor, the 
employer does not enable him to harass his subordinates.68 The Court 
noted that the supervisor does not rely on his job title to harass another 
employee and that he could harass even if he weren’t the supervisor.69 
Thus, the Court held that an employer is liable for a supervisor’s HWE 
harassment subject to an affirmative defense requiring the employer to 
prove that (a) it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct” the 
harassment; and (b) the plaintiff “unreasonably failed to take advantage 
of any preventive or corrective opportunities . . . or to avoid harm 
otherwise.”70 The Supreme Court never resolved the issue of employer 
liability for co-worker harassment. However, the Faragher Court noted a 
general agreement among circuit courts that employer liability is 
governed by the negligence standard.71 
B. Courts’ Divergent Interpretations of HWE Law 
The vagueness of the HWE standard has engendered circuit splits 
on key issues concerning its application. Lower courts vary in their 
interpretations of what kind of speech rises to the “severe and pervasive” 
                                                                                                             
 63 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-62; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 64 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See id. at 761-62. 
 67 Id. at 763. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See id. 
 70 Id. at 765. 
 71 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799 (1998). 
2006] The Retaliatory Harassment Claim 279 
level.72 The Supreme Court’s decisions in Harris and Oncale direct the 
fact finder to look at the totality of the circumstances to determine 
whether a plaintiff’s environment was objectively and subjectively 
abusive. However, as the Eighth Circuit noted in Hathaway v. Runyon, 
this standard is so vague that it leaves lower-court judges confused and 
juries “‘virtually unguided’” about the bounds of employer liability.73 
In Hathaway, the plaintiff was a postal service employee who 
claimed that her co-worker made sexual advances toward her and groped 
her rear end on two occasions.74 The plaintiff alleged that she rejected 
her co-worker’s advances and that he, in response, conspired with his 
friend to create a HWE by making noises when she walked by them.75 
The noises were described as “a purring or growling noise made in the 
throat . . . [or] a clicking of the tongue.”76 The jury awarded the plaintiff 
$75,000 for her HWE claim.77 However, the district court ordered a 
judgment in favor of the defendant, because the plaintiff failed to prove a 
HWE that was sufficiently severe and pervasive.78 The district court 
stated, with regard to the co-worker’s noises, “if that type of conduct can 
rise to the level of a sexual harassment claim in this country, we’re in 
deep trouble because it does go on in the workplace.”79 On appeal, the 
Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and ordered that the 
jury’s verdict be reinstated.80 The Eighth Circuit noted: “There is no 
bright line between sexual harassment and merely unpleasant conduct, so 
a jury’s decision must generally stand unless there is trial error.”81 
Other courts have also punished offensive conduct that either goes 
on in the workplace quite often or is not likely to be considered severe 
and pervasive harassment by a mainstream American worker. For 
instance, one Florida district court found a HWE where a work 
atmosphere was filled with sexual jokes and caricatures.82 A 
Massachusetts court held a worker liable for sexual harassment when he 
attached a photograph of a female, who was running for union office, to 
                                                                                                             
 72 David E. Bernstein, Hostile Environment Law and the Threat to Freedom of 
Expression in the Workplace, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004). 
 73 132 F.3d 1214, 1221 (8th Cir. 1997) (reacting to the Harris test). 
 74 Id. at 1217. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 1220. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 1225. 
 81 Id. at 1221 (citing Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 
1995)). 
 82 Bernstein, supra note 72, at 3 (citing Cardin v. Via Tropical Fruits, Inc., No. 88-
14201, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16302, at *24-26 (S.D. Fla. 1993)). 
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the body of a Hustler centerfold and circulated it around the office.83 
Another Massachusetts court found that an Iranian employee was 
exposed to a HWE because a co-worker hung pictures in her cubicle of 
Ayatollah Khomeini and other Iranians burning the U.S. flag.84 
Additionally, a Pennsylvania court held that “publishing religious articles 
in a company newsletter and printing Christian-themed verses on 
company paychecks constituted ‘harassment’ of a Jewish employee.”85 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris created a circuit 
split concerning the application of the reasonable person standard. The 
Harris Court held that the “reasonable person” standard should be used 
to determine whether the victim rightfully perceived her environment as 
hostile or abusive.86 However, in applying this principle, the Court 
simply cited to the lower court’s analysis, which actually employed the 
“reasonable woman” standard.87 Harris never resolved which standard is 
best or whether the standards are interchangeable.  Consequently, in the 
sexual harassment context, courts are split on whether the existence of a 
HWE is determined from the perspective of a reasonable person or a 
reasonable woman.88 
In the racial and national origin harassment contexts, some courts 
have abandoned the reasonable person standard in favor of the 
reasonable black person89 or the reasonable person of specific national 
origin standards.90 Courts using the gender, race, or national-origin-
specific standards reason that protected groups perceive workplace 
                                                                                                             
 83 Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 
563, 566 (1995) (citing Bowman v. Heller, No. 90-3269, 1993 WL 761159 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. 1993)). In a footnote, Professor Volokh explains that the employee’s actions involved 
not only pornography but also political speech about a union candidate that is at the core 
of First Amendment protection. Id. at 566 n.10. 
 84 Id. at 565-66 (citing Pakizegi v. First Nat’l Bank, 831 F. Supp. 901, 908-09 (D. 
Mass. 1993)). 
 85 Bernstein, supra note 72, at 5 (citing Brown Transp. Corp. v. Pa. Human Relations 
Comm’n, 578 A.2d 555, 562 (Pa. 1990)). 
 86 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
 87 See id. at 20. 
 88 Jessica M. Karner, Comment, Political Speech, Sexual Harassment, and a Captive 
Workforce, 83 CAL. L. REV. 637, 643 (1995); see also Mary Beth Heinzelmann, 
Comment, A Review of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Legal Issues, 12 LAW & 
SEX 337, 341-44 (2003). In addition, see Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 
620 (6th Cir. 1986), for an example of the reasonable person approach, and Ellison v. 
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991), for an example of the reasonable woman 
approach. 
 89 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 229 (citing Harris v. Int’l Paper Co., 765 F. 
Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991)). The Harris Court expressly adopted the “reasonable black 
person” standard. Id. 
 90 Id. (citing Kang v. U. Lim Am., Inc., 296 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2002)). In Kang, the 
court employed the “reasonable Korean” standard. Id. 
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behavior differently from the average American.91 Implicit in this 
reasoning is the assumption that application of a gender, race or national-
origin-specific standard to a HWE claim is likely to produce different 
results than the application of the reasonable person standard.92 
The circuits also dispute whether it matters that the alleged 
harassment occurred in a white-collar or a blue-collar environment.93 
This confusion stems from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Harris, 
which requires courts to look to the totality of circumstances, and 
Oncale, which requires courts to examine the social context of the 
plaintiff’s workplace.94 Some courts hold that the nature of the plaintiff’s 
work environment is relevant to whether she was harassed.95 For 
example, the Tenth Circuit in Gross v. Burggraf 96 was among the first 
courts to take this position. In Gross, the plaintiff was a construction-site 
truck driver who brought a HWE suit against her employer because her 
supervisor made several offensive statements.97 The Tenth Circuit held 
that the plaintiff’s claim must be judged in the context of a blue-collar 
environment.98 The court concluded that the supervisor’s speech was not 
sufficiently severe and pervasive to create a HWE because in a blue-
collar workplace, “crude language is commonly used by male and female 
employees,” and the plaintiff admitted to personally contributing to the 
“use of crude language on the job site.”99 
On the other hand, courts like the Sixth Circuit in Williams v. 
General Motors Corp. find the nature of plaintiff’s work environment 
irrelevant to whether she was harassed.100 In Williams, the plaintiff was a 
warehouse worker who alleged that she was exposed to a HWE because 
                                                                                                             
 91 See, e.g., Harris, 765 F. Supp. at 1515-16 (explaining that black Americans 
perceive racial behavior differently from white Americans). 
 92 See Heinzelmann, supra note 88, at 343. Opponents of the reasonable woman 
standard assert that it highlights the differences in male and female viewpoints and fails 
to represent the experiences of all women. Id. They argue that this test only accounts for 
the dominant female group: “‘white, affluent, heterosexual women.’”  Id. (quoting 
MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 244 (1999)). 
 93 Jeffrey Lyons, Comment, Be Prepared: Unsuspecting Employers are Vulnerable 
for Title VII Sexual Harassment Environment Claims, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 467, 483-85 
(2003). 
 94 Id. at 484-85. 
 95 Michael Frank, The Social Context Variable in Hostile Environment Litigation, 77 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 437, 440 (2002) (citing the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and the 
District of Columbia Circuits, along with various district and state courts, as proponents 
of this approach). 
 96 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 97 Id. at 1535. 
 98 Id. at 1537-38. 
 99 Id. at 1537-38, 1542. 
 100 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Frank, supra note 95, at 441 (citing the First 
and Fourth Circuits as proponents of the Williams approach). 
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her supervisor made sexual remarks toward her, other employees used 
vulgar language around her, other employees treated her poorly, and she 
was denied certain employment benefits.101 The Sixth Circuit stated that 
it rejects “the view that the standard for sexual harassment varies 
depending on the work environment” because “women working in the 
trades do not deserve less protection from the law.”102 The Sixth Circuit 
based its decision on equality considerations, not on the Harris and 
Oncale tests.103 
Because of these circuit splits an employer who wants to avoid 
liability by preventing and detecting a HWE cannot effectively regulate 
employee conduct. These mixed messages also fail to provide juries with 
clear guidance on the bounds of employer liability.104 Consequently, 
juries have awarded thousands of dollars to accusers for claims that were 
later dismissed on appeal for failure to raise genuine issues of material 
fact as to the employers’ guilt.105 In fact, employers often settle claims 
that lack merit, because they fear losing thousands of dollars from juries’ 
largely subjective HWE findings.106 Although a meritless claim would 
likely be overturned on appeal, few employers take the risk to find out.107 
Employers would rather settle than appeal a verdict because appellate 
courts apply the deferential “clearly erroneous” standard to review HWE 
findings.108 Litigating an appeal is not only risky, but can also cost 
hundreds of thousands of dollars.109 Therefore, it makes more economic 
sense for employers to settle. 
IV. WHAT IT MEANS TO DISCRIMINATE UNDER THE RETALIATION 
PROVISION 
The retaliation provision, section 704(a), prohibits an employer 
from discriminating against an employee, because she engaged in 
activity protected by Title VII.110 Courts agree that a retaliation claim 
requires proof of an employee’s protected activity, an employer’s 
adverse action and a causal link between the two.111 However, the circuit 
                                                                                                             
 101 Id. at 559. 
 102 Id. at 564. 
 103 Lyons, supra note 93, at 484-85. 
 104 See Bernstein, supra note 72, at 3-4. 
 105 Id. at 4. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. (explaining that an appeals court will only overrule a jury’s HWE finding if it is 
“clearly erroneous”). 
 109 Id. 
 110 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 111 Currie, supra note 7, at 1329 (explaining that most circuits have relied on this 
standard since the early 1980s). 
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courts have issued divergent opinions interpreting all three requirements; 
the circuit splits have caused much confusion for employers seeking to 
prevent section 704(a) liability. In Burlington Northern, the Supreme 
Court clarified the meaning of adverse employment action.112 However, 
the Court did not resolve the remaining section 704(a) ambiguities 
concerning the scope of protected conduct and the required causal link. 
A. The Retaliatory Discrimination Standard 
To plead a prima facie retaliation claim, the plaintiff must prove 
that (1) she engaged in protected expression; (2) her employer subjected 
her to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal 
connection between her protected act and the employer’s adverse 
action.113 The causal connection can be proven by direct evidence of 
retaliatory intent or by circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment.114 
When the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting framework that was developed for cases 
brought under the main discrimination provision will apply.115 Thus, the 
burden shifts to the employer to proffer a nondiscriminatory, legitimate 
justification for taking the adverse employment action.116 Then the 
burden shifts again to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s proffered 
justification is just a pretext for discrimination.117 
1. First Prong—Engagement in Protected Expression 
The first prong requires a showing that the plaintiff engaged in 
expression protected by Title VII. The language of section 704(a) refers 
to two kinds of protected expression: participation in enforcing Title VII 
and opposition to any practice “made an unlawful employment practice 
by [Title VII].”118 Participation includes a wide variety of activities, 
which include making a charge or assisting in a Title VII investigation, 
hearing, or proceeding.119 Opposition is a more complex standard, which 
entails communicating to the employer or another entity a belief that 
                                                                                                             
 112 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006). 
 113 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 221. 
 114 Id. 
 115 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Cude 
& Steger, supra note 24, at 376 (noting that, although the Supreme Court articulated this 
burden-shifting framework for disparate treatment cases litigated under the main 
discrimination provision, most lower courts have applied it to retaliation cases). 
 116 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. 
 117 Id. at 804. 
 118 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
 119 Id. 
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unlawful activity has taken place.120 Lower courts vary in their 
interpretations of the opposition standard. 
For example, lower courts disagree on whether the plaintiff must 
prove that unlawful activity actually occurred. The Supreme Court 
grappled with this issue in Clark County v. Breeden,121 but declined to 
resolve it. In Breeden, the plaintiff met with her supervisor and a co-
worker to discuss the results of several job applicants’ psychological 
examinations.122 One applicant’s examination declared that he made the 
following statement to his co-worker: “‘I hear making love to you is like 
making love to the Grand Canyon.’”123 The supervisor remarked that he 
did not understand the statement and the plaintiff’s co-worker jokingly 
replied that he would explain it later.124 Both men laughed. The plaintiff 
perceived this conduct as sexual harassment and filed charges against her 
employer.125 Subsequently, the plaintiff was transferred to a position she 
did not like, so she brought the suit for retaliation.126 
The Ninth Circuit held that she was protected from retaliation even 
though her complaint was not based on unlawful conduct because all she 
had to prove was a good faith, reasonable belief that her supervisor’s and 
co-worker’s laughs were unlawful.127 The Supreme Court reversed the 
decision.128 The Court declined to resolve the circuit split, but held that 
no person could “reasonably believe that the incident recounted above 
violated Title VII[’s standard.]”129 Since this decision, many lower courts 
have held that the plaintiff does not need to prove that unlawful activity 
occurred so long as she reasonably and in good faith believed that it 
did.130 This reasonable belief standard is problematic for employers, 
because it is vague and courts vary widely in its interpretation.131 
Circuit courts are also split regarding what kind of opposition 
activity section 704(a) protects.132 Opposition activity may include 
refusing to follow unlawful orders or filing informal complaints, internal 
                                                                                                             
 120 PATRICIA WISE, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING WORKPLACE RETALIATION 14 
(2000). 
 121 532 U.S. 268 (2001). 
 122 Id. at 269. 
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 125 Id. at 271. 
 126 See id. at 271-72. 
 127 Breeden v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 232 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished 
opinion), rev’d, 532 U.S. 268 (2001). 
 128 Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271. 
 129 Id. at 270. 
 130 WISE, supra note 120, at 17-18. 
 131 Id. at 17. 
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complaints, and even vague complaints.133 Courts concur that opposition 
activity is protected so long as it is reasonable, but disagree on what 
“reasonable” means.134 As per the EEOC regulations, courts consider 
opposition unreasonable if it unduly disrupts the employer’s business or 
interferes with the employee’s job performance.135 For example, in 
Douglas v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., the plaintiff, an 
in-house attorney, sent letters to company outsiders that described the 
company’s allegedly unlawful employment practices and disclosed 
confidential information protected by the attorney-client privilege.136 The 
company terminated her and she brought suit.137 The plaintiff alleged that 
her letters were opposition activity and that the company retaliated 
against her because she sent them.138 The Fifth Circuit held that the 
plaintiff’s opposition activity was not protected because it was 
“‘detrimental to the position of responsibility held by [her].’”139 
However, some courts interpret the “unreasonableness” requirement 
narrowly for fear of chilling employee activism.140 For example, some 
courts have held that employees’ letters to their employers’ customers 
containing damaging information constituted protected opposition, even 
where the letters were not based on accurate information and unduly 
disrupted the employer’s business.141 In EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach 
Corp., Crown’s employees wrote a letter to one of the company’s most 
important customers stating that Crown engages in racist employment 
practices.142 Crown terminated the employees who signed the letter on 
the grounds that they were disloyal.143 The Ninth Circuit agreed that the 
                                                                                                             
 133 Id. at 15. 
 134 Id. at 17-18. 
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286 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 3:269 
letter was disloyal, but noted that it was protected opposition 
nevertheless.144 The Ninth Circuit opined: 
Almost every form of “opposition to an unlawful employment 
practice” is in some sense “disloyal” to the employer, since it 
entails a disagreement with the employer’s views and a challenge 
to the employer’s policies. . . . If discharge or other disciplinary 
sanctions may be imposed based simply on “disloyal” conduct, it 
is difficult to see what opposition would remain protected.145 
2. Third Prong—Causation 
Courts agree that the causal link between a protected activity and an 
adverse employment decision could be established through direct or 
circumstantial evidence.146 However, courts are split on what degree of 
proof establishes causation.147 For example, the Fifth Circuit requires the 
protected conduct to be the “but for cause” of the employment action.148 
But other circuits require only that the “protected activity and the 
negative employment action are not completely unrelated.”149 
Temporal proximity between the protected conduct and the adverse 
action may be used as circumstantial evidence to prove or disprove 
causation.150 The Supreme Court held in Clark County School Dist. v. 
Breeden that temporal proximity may be used as the sole evidence of 
causation if the period between the protected activity and the adverse 
action is “very close.”151 This standard does not provide courts with 
much guidance because the “very close” requirement is inherently 
subjective. Consequently, lower courts often disagree about how much 
                                                                                                             
 144 Id. at 1014. 
 145 Id.; see also WISE, supra note 120, at 19. In discussing the Crown decision, Wise 
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 151 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001). 
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temporal proximity or distance is sufficient.152 For example, the Third 
Circuit has held that “‘temporal proximity between the protected activity 
and the termination is sufficient to establish a causal link.’”153 Yet the 
Eighth Circuit maintains that temporal proximity, by itself, does not 
establish causation.154 In addition, this form of evidence is so subjective 
that judges within the same circuit render conflicting decisions.155 For 
example, one Fifth Circuit decision held that “a fourteen-month gap 
between the filing of an initial bias charge with the EEOC and the 
employee’s discharge did not disprove her retaliation claim.”156 But three 
years later, the Fifth Circuit held that “a [fifteen-sixteen] month gap 
between the filing of a workers’ compensation claim and discharge 
‘militates against’ a finding of retaliation.”157 
3. Second Prong—Adverse Employment Action 
Prior to Burlington Northern, courts followed either the narrow-
view, broad-view or moderate-view definition of “adverse employment 
action.”158 In Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court adopted the 
broad-view definition. Consequently, narrow-view circuits that relied on 
their definition of an adverse employment action in declining to 
recognize retaliatory harassment must now recognize this claim. 
i. The Narrow View 
According to the narrow view, an adverse employment action 
consists of an ultimate employment decision that produces a “tangible 
change in duties or working conditions” and results in a “material 
employment disadvantage.”159 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits followed 
this approach.160 According to these circuits, an ultimate employment 
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 154 Id. (quoting Feltmann v. Seiben, 108 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 1997)). 
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action includes hiring, discharging, promoting, demoting, and granting or 
denying compensation or reassignment.161 By contrast, an adverse 
employment action does not include an interlocutory decision that may 
tangentially effect an ultimate employment decision, such as a lateral 
transfer,162 poor treatment by supervisors or co-workers,163 a verbal 
reprimand and a missed pay raise.164 
Narrow-view circuits relied on two main rationales to justify their 
decisions. First, according to the policy rationale, allowing actions short 
of ultimate employment decisions to predicate retaliation liability would 
render the employer liable for any decision that “might jeopardize [the 
plaintiff’s] employment in the future.”165 This could result in employer 
liability for a wide variety of routine administrative actions that produce 
no current material disadvantage.166 Second, The Fifth Circuit in Mattern 
v. Eastman Kodak Co., explained the statutory-construction rationale.167 
The Mattern court relied on the main discrimination provision for help in 
interpreting the retaliation provision.168 The court compared subsections 
(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the main discrimination provision, noting that (a)(1) 
proscribes a definite set of harms, while (a)(2) is more vague and, 
consequently, more broad.169 Specifically, the court noted that (a)(1) 
makes it illegal for an employer to “‘fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment.’”170 However, the court pointed out that (a)(2) prohibits an 
employer from limiting an employee in ways “which deprive or ‘would 
tend to deprive’ the employee of ‘opportunities’ or ‘adversely affect his 
status’”171 The Mattern court concluded that because the retaliation 
provision only mentions “discrimination,” as does subpart (a)(1), and 
does not discuss the vague misconduct described in (a)(2), it must not 
include the vague proscriptions of (a)(2).172 Thus, reading the retaliation 
                                                                                                             
 161 See cases cited supra note 160. 
 162 Harlston, 37 F. 3d at 382. 
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 170 Id. at 708 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). 
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2006] The Retaliatory Harassment Claim 289 
provision consistently with subpart (a)(1), the court held that the 
retaliation provision only applies to discrimination based on terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment and other tangible harms.173 
ii. The Broad View 
Unlike the narrow view, this approach was promulgated by the 
EEOC in 1998 in an attempt to clarify the scope of the retaliation 
statute.174 According to the EEOC guidelines, an adverse employment 
decision is any adverse action reasonably likely to discourage an 
employee from participating in protected activity.175 The First, Seventh, 
Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits subscribe to this approach.176 
These courts maintain that adverse employment actions can include 
interlocutory decisions that do not immediately change the terms and 
conditions of the plaintiff’s employment.177 Examples of adverse 
employment actions under this approach include bad references, poor 
performance evaluations and negative remarks about an employee.178 
This approach even includes actions that do not result in adverse 
economic consequences, such as transferring an employee to a lateral 
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 177 See cases cited supra note 176. 
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position, cutting off challenging assignments, relocating the employee 
from a nice office to a dingy closet and changing the work schedule.179 
The EEOC and the aforementioned circuits rationalize this standard 
through policy and statutory construction. As a policy matter, these 
courts feel that by focusing on the deterrent effects of an employment 
action, this standard furthers the retaliation provision’s remedial 
purpose.180 With respect to statutory construction, these courts maintain 
that section 704(a)’s language “does not limit what type of 
discrimination is covered, nor does it prescribe a minimum level of 
severity for actionable discrimination.”181 
iii. The Moderate View 
Courts following the moderate view held that an adverse 
employment action could be an ultimate employment decision or a 
decision materially affecting employment privileges, conditions, terms or 
compensation.182 The Second, Third, Fourth and Sixth Circuits followed 
this approach.183 These circuits maintained that a reduction in job 
responsibilities or professional status, a poor performance review, a 
denial of salary and benefits, and other interlocutory employment 
decisions could constitute adverse employment actions.184 Circuit courts 
relying on this approach justified it as a compromise between two 
opposite positions and argued that it was consistent with the main 
discrimination provision’s language.185 In adopting this approach, the 
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Fourth Circuit criticized the broad-view courts for contravening 
legislative intent by interpreting the retaliation provision so broadly that 
it provides more protection than the main discrimination provision.186 
4. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White 
In Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court sided with the broad-
view circuits, holding that discrimination includes “materially adverse” 
actions that “might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination.’”187 The Court rejected the broad 
and moderate-view circuits’ position that the adverse action must relate 
to employment privileges, conditions, terms or compensation.188 The 
Court, while extensively quoting the EEOC, reasoned that the retaliation 
provision’s main purpose is to ensure that employees are not penalized 
for engaging in protected activity.189 Ultimately, the Court explained that 
employers could penalize employees through employment and non-
employment related actions; therefore, the latter are also prohibited under 
the retaliation provision.190 
V. TREATMENT OF RETALIATORY HARASSMENT UNDER THE THREE 
VIEWS 
Retaliatory harassment occurs when a supervisor or a co-worker 
retaliates against an employee, who engaged in protected expression, by 
creating a HWE. Much like HWE harassment under the main 
discrimination provision, retaliatory harassment consists of actions that 
do not produce tangible or economic harm. Retaliatory harassment can 
take the form of name-calling, poor performance evaluations, pranks or 
encouraging co-worker ostracism. Prior to Burlington Northern, various 
broad-view and moderate-view circuits began to recognize retaliatory 
harassment claims. These courts applied the legal standards developed 
for HWE harassment under section 703(a) to this section 704(a) claim. 
A. The Narrow View 
Prior to Burlington Northern, the narrow-view circuits did not 
recognize HWE harassment as an adverse employment action under the 
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retaliation provision.191 These circuits did not differentiate between 
supervisor and co-worker harassment.192 The Fifth Circuit addressed 
retaliatory harassment for the first time in Mattern.193 There, the plaintiff 
was a student in a mechanic’s apprenticeship program.194 She filed an 
EEOC charge, claiming her supervisors created a HWE for her through 
sexual harassment.195 
The employer took corrective action by “allowing” one alleged 
harasser to retire early and transferring the plaintiff to another crew.196 
The plaintiff subsequently encountered the following difficulties at work: 
(1) she told her supervisor that she needed to go home due to a work-
related sickness, he instructed her to report to the company medical 
office, she refused and went home, so he came to her house to tell her to 
report to the medical office; (2) she was disciplined for leaving her 
designated work station; (3) she experienced hostility from co-workers, 
who refused to say “hello” and allegedly stole tools from her locker; (4) 
her doctor called her employer to discuss her work-related anxiety, but 
the employer never returned her doctor’s phone call; and (5) she was 
unable to complete an assignment and twice failed her Major Skills 
Tests, which caused her supervisors to give her negative performance 
evaluations and pass her over for a pay increase.197 The jury found 
against the plaintiff on her HWE claim, because the employer satisfied 
the affirmative defense by taking prompt corrective action.198 However, 
the jury awarded her $50,000 in damages on her retaliation claim.199 The 
Fifth Circuit reversed the jury’s verdict on the retaliation claim.200 The 
court held that supervisor or co-worker harassment constitutes an 
interlocutory employment decision that may have a “mere tangential 
effect on a possible future ultimate employment decision.”201 Thus, the 
court concluded that such harassment was not actionable under section 
704(a) as an adverse employment action.202 
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B. The Broad View 
Most broad-view circuits have expressly held that supervisor and 
co-worker harassment can predicate liability under the retaliation 
provision.203 The Seventh Circuit was among the first to recognize co-
worker harassment in Knox v. State of Indiana.204 The plaintiff in Knox 
was a corrections officer who filed sexual harassment charges against her 
captain.205 She alleged that her captain emailed her with various sexual 
proposals and called her house to ask her out on a date.206 In response to 
the plaintiff’s complaint, her employer demoted the captain.207 The 
plaintiff alleged that because she caused the captain’s demotion, her co-
workers subjected her to a HWE by gossiping about her to inmates and 
other institutional workers.208 
The plaintiff reported her co-workers’ conduct to an affirmative 
action officer.209 However, the officer responded that she could not act 
on the plaintiff’s complaint until the plaintiff provided her with specific 
names of co-workers who were making the negative remarks.210 
Subsequently, the plaintiff found out who the gossipers were and 
reported them.211 In response, the affirmative action officer counseled all 
four of them and recommended one for further disciplinary action.212 
Nevertheless, the plaintiff filed suit against her employer for HWE 
harassment and retaliatory harassment.213 
The jury found in the employer’s favor on the HWE claim, but in 
the plaintiff’s favor on the retaliation claim, awarding her $40,000.214 On 
appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the jury verdict.215 The court held 
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that co-worker gossip that is not directly addressed to the plaintiff could 
constitute actionable retaliatory harassment.216 Additionally, the court 
held that an employer is liable for co-worker retaliatory harassment “if 
the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment and 
failed to address the problem adequately.”217 In this case, the court 
recognized that the employer took corrective action in response to the 
plaintiff’s retaliation complaint.218 However, the court also deferred to 
the jury’s finding that the employer’s corrective action was inadequate.219 
The Seventh Circuit jumped through hoops to justify the jury’s 
reasoning, stating that perhaps the affirmative action officer’s initial 
request for the gossipers’ names was a “brush-off, motivated by the 
trouble [the plaintiff’s] complaints had caused for the institution.”220 
The Tenth Circuit was first to toy with the notion of applying the 
HWE framework to retaliatory harassment claims. In Gunnell v. Utah 
Valley State College, the Tenth Circuit held that co-worker harassment is 
actionable retaliation only if it is sufficiently severe and pervasive.221 The 
Gunnel court also held that employers could be liable for forms (2) and 
(3) of co-worker harassment.222 Thereafter, the First and Ninth Circuits 
expressly held that HWE law governs retaliatory harassment claims.223 
C. The Moderate View 
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits, the moderate-view circuits, held that 
supervisor harassment constitutes an adverse employment action.224 
These circuits maintained that supervisor harassment is actionable only if 
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it adversely affects the “terms, conditions, or benefits” of the plaintiff’s 
employment.225 These circuits applied HWE harassment law to 
retaliatory harassment claims.226 The Second Circuit recognized co-
worker harassment as actionable retaliation in Richardson v. New York 
State Dep’t of Correctional Services.227 The Second Circuit also held that 
HWE law governs co-worker retaliatory harassment claims.228 
D. The Effect of Burlington Northern 
While Burlington Northern did not specifically mention retaliatory 
harassment, its broad definition of adverse employment action 
encompasses this claim.229 All courts must now recognize retaliatory 
harassment. However, Burlington Northern did not address whether 
HWE harassment standards apply to retaliation claims. Consequently, 
employers remain unguided on their liability for retaliatory harassment. 
VI. USING HWE HARASSMENT LAW TO ADJUDICATE RETALIATORY 
HARASSMENT CLAIMS MAKES IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR 
EMPLOYERS TO PREVENT LIABILITY—A NEW APPROACH IS NEEDED 
Courts addressing the retaliatory harassment claim have not 
addressed the practical consequences it imposes on American employers. 
This comment argues that the application of HWE harassment principles 
to retaliatory harassment claims creates confusion for employers seeking 
to prevent liability. In addition, this approach allows litigants with weak 
HWE harassment claims to bypass HWE harassment requirements. 
Therefore, lower courts should develop a new standard for adjudicating 
retaliatory harassment claims. 
A.  Applying HWE Law to Retaliatory Harassment Claims Confuses 
Employers About Their Liability Under Title VII 
The affirmative defense established in Ellerth and Faragher 
requires employers to exercise “reasonable care to prevent and correct” 
harassment.230 However, the employer cannot exercise reasonable care 
until it discerns for which conduct it will be liable. Even without the 
retaliatory harassment cause of action, an employer has a difficult time 
measuring the bounds of its liability because of Title VII’s vague 
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language, the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court and the 
consequent circuit splits on the HWE and retaliation standards. Since a 
large employer cannot necessarily predict the state in which a plaintiff 
will bring a Title VII claim against it, the employer must somehow 
harmonize the circuits’ divergent Title VII standards and attempt to 
prevent liability under all of them. 
With respect to HWE harassment under section 703(a), an 
employer does not receive clear guidance on what kind of conduct 
constitutes sufficiently severe and pervasive hostility; whether it should 
analyze such conduct from the viewpoint of a woman or a minority; and 
whether it is relevant that its work culture is blue collar, as opposed to 
white collar.231 With respect to retaliation under section 704(a), an 
employer is left wondering whether an employee is protected for 
reporting conduct that is perfectly lawful; whether it can punish a 
disloyal employee who disrupts its business while claiming to oppose 
unlawful action; and whether it can have retaliatory animus imputed to it 
simply because it takes an adverse employment action against an 
employee “shortly” after she engages in protected activity.232 By 
applying HWE law to retaliatory harassment claims, courts combine the 
circuit splits from both provisions into one cause of action, making it 
more difficult than ever for an employer to assess and prevent Title VII 
liability. Such decisions leave the employer confused about how to spot 
protected conduct and what kind of supervisor or employee responses to 
the protected conduct it must regulate. 
To play it safe, an employer must regard any participation or 
opposition activity as protected conduct, even where the employee 
opposes an action that is perfectly lawful or conducts the opposition in a 
disruptive manner.233 Once an employee engages in protected conduct, 
the retaliatory harassment cause of action forces the employer to monitor 
and regulate any subsequent offensive treatment that employee 
encounters. Specifically, when HWE law is applied under the main 
discrimination provision, an employer at least knows that it has to ferret 
out offensive behavior that is sexually, racially, nationally or religiously 
themed.234 Such behavior is not too difficult to spot. For example, sex-
based HWE harassment may involve unwelcome remarks about a 
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plaintiff’s anatomy, sexually explicit jokes and photographs, or sexist 
comments.235 Likewise race-based harassment may involve making 
negative statements about a particular race or giving one race preferential 
treatment.236 
However, when HWE law is applied in the retaliation context, an 
employer is liable for offensive conduct that may or may not involve a 
retaliatory theme.237 For example, an employee may bring a retaliatory 
harassment claim if her employer transfers her from a “brightly lit office 
to a dingy closet,” gives her a bad reference or performance review, or 
denies her a raise after she has engaged in protected expression.238 In 
such a case, the employer’s conduct does not reference the plaintiff’s 
protected expression and could be based on legitimate business reasons. 
Further, according to Burlington Northern, the retaliatory harassment 
does not even need to be employment related.239 Thus, in holding that an 
adverse employment action is motivated by retaliation, courts often rely 
on inferences. 
The First Circuit acknowledged this point in Noviello v. City of 
Boston.240 The court stated that finding retaliatory intent in retaliatory 
harassment claims involves a “more nuanced” analysis than finding 
discrimination based on protected characteristics in HWE harassment 
claims.241 The court explained: “When dealing with discriminatory 
harassment . . . there is seldom, if ever, a defensible purpose behind the 
injurious actions. The only question is whether the bad acts, taken in the 
aggregate, are sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute actionable 
harassment.”242 By contrast, the First Circuit noted that actions perceived 
as retaliatory harassment can have numerous defensible purposes, such 
as co-workers’ desires to defend the accused harasser.243 Having to 
monitor any offensive behavior occurring after an employee engages in 
protected expression is particularly troublesome for the blue-collar 
                                                                                                             
 235 See, e.g., supra Part III (discussing various sexual harassment cases). 
 236 See, e.g., supra Part III (discussing various race-based harassment cases). 
 237 See supra Part VI.B. 
 238 See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text. 
 239 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414 (2006). 
 240 398 F.3d 76, 92-93 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 241 Id. at 93. 
 242 Id. at 92-93. 
 243 Id. at 93. Unfortunately, the court’s solution to this ambiguity was to delineate an 
ever more ambiguous list of factors that are supposed to inform the process of separating 
permissible responses to the plaintiff’s protected activity from impermissible harassment. 
See id. The factors include “the relative ubiquity of the retaliatory conduct, its severity, 
its natural tendency to humiliate and, on occasion, physically threaten a reasonable 
person, and its capacity to interfere with the plaintiff’s work performance.”  Id. 
298 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 3:269 
employer, whose workplace is permeated with vulgar expression.244 
Under the HWE standard, a blue-collar employer may not be able to use 
the nature of its work environment to prove that offensive expression 
following protected activity was typical rather than retaliatory. 
Another ambiguity presented by the retaliatory harassment claim is 
whether an employer must judge sexually, racially or nationally themed 
retaliation from the viewpoint of a woman or minority rather than a 
reasonable person. This issue has not been addressed by the courts. In 
Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court stated that retaliation must be 
judged from the viewpoint of a “reasonable employee.” However, as 
Justice Alito pointed out in his concurring opinion, “[t]he majority’s 
conception of a reasonable worker is unclear. Although the majority first 
states that its test is whether a ‘reasonable worker’ might well be 
dissuaded, it later suggests that at least some individual characteristics of 
the actual retaliation victim must be taken into account.”245 
Even if an employer spots conduct that looks like retaliation, it has 
to wonder whether the conduct is sufficiently severe and pervasive. 
Courts vary widely in their interpretations of this requirement under 
section 703(a), and it is not clear that decisions based on section 703(a) 
harassment are relevant in the section 704(a) context. It seems 
unreasonable to equate the effects of sexist or racist expression on 
particular employees to the effects of offensive expression on employees 
who previously complained about “unlawful conduct.” For example, in 
Ray v. Henderson the plaintiff’s supervisors called him “a ‘liar,’ a 
‘troublemaker,’ and a ‘rabble rouser,’ and told him to ‘shut up’” after he 
complained about their treatment of female employees.246 In applying the 
HWE harassment case law to determine whether the plaintiff’s 
supervisors engaged in sufficiently severe retaliatory harassment, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that “[r]epeated derogatory or humiliating statements 
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. . . can constitute a [HWE].”247 To support that proposition, the Court 
cited to a section 703(a) decision that found a HWE where “one 
supervisor ‘repeatedly engaged in vulgarities, made sexual remarks, and 
requested sexual favors’ while another supervisor ‘frequently witnessed, 
laughed at, or herself made these types of comments.’”248 The court 
analogized the sexually vulgar remarks to the name-calling experienced 
by the plaintiff in Ray, concluding that both types of derogatory 
statements could constitute sufficiently severe harassment.249 The court 
then reversed the lower court’s summary judgment order in the 
defendant’s favor.250 
The Ninth Circuit assumed that sexual vulgarities are analogous to 
name-calling, such that both are subject to the same threshold of 
“severity.” However, this assumption contradicts Title VII’s main 
purpose, which lies in the recognition that a limited group of minorities 
require extra protection from workplace discrimination.251 Title VII 
acknowledges that such minorities have historically experienced adverse 
treatment based on their characteristics that has made them sensitive to 
certain conduct.252 The supervisor’s sexually vulgar comments were 
severe to that plaintiff because, as a woman, she has a “greater physical 
and social vulnerability to sexual coercion . . . [that can make her] wary 
of sexual encounters.”253 However, the plaintiff in Ray was offended by 
his supervisor’s comments simply because they were rude, not because 
they reinforced a historical bias that he suffered through. The plaintiff in 
Ray was not particularly sensitive to his supervisor’s name-calling, so it 
is incorrect to posit that the names affected him in the same way that the 
sexual vulgarities affected the woman. 
B. Retaliatory Harassment Claims Allow Plaintiffs to Bypass HWE 
Requirements 
The retaliatory harassment claim makes it possible for a plaintiff 
with a weak HWE claim to bypass the HWE harassment affirmative 
defense, causation requirement, and “severe and pervasive” harassment 
threshold. Once a plaintiff files suit under section 704(a), she attains the 
status of “protected employee.”254 She can then bring a retaliatory 
harassment claim against her employer for subsequent, offensive 
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treatment she experiences from her supervisor or co-workers. The 
employer may not be able to assert the Ellerth/Faragher defense in 
response to a retaliatory harassment claim because some courts 
recognizing retaliatory harassment do not discuss the availability of the 
affirmative defense.255 Even if the defense is available, the First 
Amendment may restrict an employer from regulating retaliatory 
expression that is not facially discriminatory.256 
Also, even if the employer successfully pleads the affirmative 
defense proving that it exercised reasonable measures to prevent or 
correct the HWE, the employee may still recover damages by showing 
that the employer failed to prevent and correct subsequent negative 
treatment that may be regarded as retaliation. For example, in Nye v. 
Roberts, the plaintiff, a school psychologist, complained to the school 
board that the principal had sexually harassed her.257 The school board 
investigated her complaint, transferred her to a different school district at 
her request, and ordered the principal to take a sexual harassment 
seminar.258 Nevertheless, the plaintiff filed a HWE harassment claim 
against her employer based on the principal’s alleged conduct and she 
also notified the EEOC that the principal had allegedly harassed her co-
worker.259 The plaintiff’s co-worker denied she was ever harassed and 
expressed her anger with the plaintiff in an affidavit.260 Consequently, the 
plaintiff’s supervisor wrote her a letter of reprimand, criticizing her for 
filing a fraudulent complaint on behalf of a co-worker who denied all 
allegations asserted therein and for treating other co-workers poorly.261 
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The plaintiff responded by filing a retaliation claim against her 
employer based on her supervisor’s letter.262 The Fourth Circuit upheld a 
summary judgment in the defendant’s favor on the plaintiff’s HWE 
claim, because the principal did not possess enough authority over the 
plaintiff to impute his actions to the employer and the employer acted 
reasonably to prevent and correct the alleged harassment.263 However, 
the Fourth Circuit held that the employer could be liable for the 
supervisor’s letter of reprimand and that the letter arguably contains 
direct evidence of retaliatory animus, because it criticizes the plaintiff for 
filing a fraudulent HWE harassment complaint on behalf of a co-
worker.264 Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court’s summary 
judgment order on the plaintiff’s retaliation claim, allowing it to go to 
trial.265 
The retaliatory harassment claim may also allow an employee to 
bypass the “because of” and “severe and pervasive” requirements. For 
example, in Clark County v. Breeden, the plaintiff brought a meritless 
sexual harassment complaint against her employer based on her co-
workers’ sexually themed discussion that was not directed at her or 
intended to derogate any woman.266 Even though the court dismissed her 
claim, she subsequently sued her employer for retaliation when she was 
transferred to a position she did not like.267 The Ninth Circuit held that 
even though her HWE claim lacked merit, she had a cognizable 
retaliation claim.268 Ultimately, the Supreme Court overruled that 
decision.269 
As explained in subsection (a), a retaliatory harassment claim is not 
limited by a “because of” requirement that narrows the scope of 
actionable expression.270 Therefore, the fact finder is free to scrutinize 
any and all offensive behavior the plaintiff encounters after engaging in 
protected activity. Even behavior that is not related to the plaintiff’s 
employment is subject to scrutiny. The larger volume of evidence makes 
a finding of “severe and pervasive” harassment more likely.271 Also, 
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broad-view courts apply HWE law’s “sufficiently severe and pervasive” 
threshold in the context of a general policy that any adverse employment 
decision is actionable retaliation if it is likely to discourage an employee 
from participating in protected activity.272  
Recently, the Supreme Court adopted this policy in Burlington 
Northern. Neither the Supreme Court nor the broad-view courts have 
clarified the relationship between these two standards. At least one 
commentator argues that the “severe and pervasive” requirement must be 
interpreted with greater laxity in the retaliatory harassment context, 
because offensive behavior does not have to be so severe as to 
discourage an employee from engaging in protected activity.273 To the 
extent that courts allow this view to color their decisions, a litigant can 
utilize a retaliatory harassment claim to bypass HWE law’s more 
stringent “severe and pervasive” harassment threshold. 
C. Courts Must Adopt a Clearer Standard for Adjudicating Retaliatory 
Harassment Claims to Ease Employer Confusion 
The practice of importing HWE harassment law into the retaliatory 
harassment claim makes it virtually impossible for employers to assess 
and prevent liability. This practice piles circuit splits on top of circuit 
splits. Courts should enable employers to assert the Ellerth/Faragher 
affirmative defense to retaliatory harassment claims by providing clear 
guidance on what constitutes protected conduct, an adverse employment 
action and sufficient causation between the two. Narrow-view circuits 
that must now recognize retaliatory harassment claims should formulate 
a clearer retaliatory harassment standard rather than adopt the broad-
view and moderate-view circuits’ approach. 
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